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Why Pay for a Company That Loses Money? Growth Stocks for Beginners

A note on authorship: The research, analysis, and opinions in this article are the author's own. Claude (Anthropic's AI) assisted with drafting and editing the prose.

This is Part 4 of our Stock Market Basics series. So far our coffee shop has been a steady, sensible business. It makes a profit every year, it has more cash than debt, and in Part 3 we worked out what it's worth from the cash it produces.

But some of the most talked-about companies on the stock market look nothing like that. They lose money every year, and investors still pay billions for their shares. This article explains why, and introduces the tools investors use to put a price on a business that has no profit yet.

What you'll learn:

  • What a growth company is, and why losing money isn't always a bad sign
  • Margins: how much of each sale a business keeps, today and later
  • Cash burn and dilution: where a loss-making company gets its money, and who pays for it
  • Enterprise value: what it really costs to buy a whole business, debts included
  • Price-to-sales and EV/Sales: how to price a company when there's no profit to measure
  • A real-world example: Rivian and Toyota, two car makers priced in very different ways

Meet BeanRush, the shop that loses money

A new coffee business opens up down the road. It's called BeanRush, and it isn't trying to run one great café. It's trying to open a new café every few months, all over town.

By coincidence, BeanRush's sales last year were exactly the same as our shop's: $100,000. That's where the similarity ends:

Our shopBeanRush
Revenue (sales) last year$100,000$100,000
How fast sales are growinghardly at all50% a year
Profit (earnings)$20,000−$10,000 (a loss)
Free cash flow$15,000−$40,000
Cash in the bank$40,000$20,000
Bank loan$30,000$60,000
Number of shares100100
Price per share$2,000$4,000

Read that last row again. BeanRush loses money, has less cash and more debt than our shop, and its shares cost twice as much. Its market capitalisation (price per share × number of shares) is 100 × $4,000 = $400,000, against our shop's $200,000.

Are BeanRush's investors mad? Not necessarily. They're looking at one row: sales growing 50% a year. A business like this, where sales grow far faster than normal and the company spends heavily to keep it that way, is called a growth company, and its shares are called growth stocks.

Step 1: Why the usual yardsticks break

Try the tools from the earlier parts of this series on BeanRush:

So investors in growth companies need different questions. There are really only two that matter:

1. How big can the sales get?

2. Once the company stops expanding, how much of each sale will it keep as profit?

The first is about growth. The second is about something called the margin.

Step 2: Margins, today and later

A margin is the share of each sale a business keeps. The most common one is the profit margin:

Profit margin = profit ÷ revenue

Our shop: $20,000 ÷ $100,000 = 20%. From every $5 cup of coffee, it keeps $1 as profit.

BeanRush: −$10,000 ÷ $100,000 = −10%. On every $5 cup, it loses 50 cents.

You met the same idea in Part 2 as profit per car: Ferrari keeps far more from each car it sells than Toyota does.

Why is BeanRush's margin negative? Not because people won't pay for its coffee. It's because every new café costs money before it earns any: hiring and training staff, advertising the opening, paying rent while the place is still quiet. With a new café opening every few months, BeanRush is always paying for the next one. Its older cafés may be just as profitable as ours. The newest ones drag the total down.

That's why growth investors care less about today's margin and more about the margin the company could reach once it stops expanding. If BeanRush one day stops opening cafés, will its margin settle at 20% like ours? 15%? 5%? Nobody knows for sure, and that uncertainty is where the risk lives.

Step 3: Cash burn, and who pays for it

BeanRush's free cash flow is −$40,000 a year. Spending more cash than the business brings in is called cash burn. And BeanRush only has $20,000 in the bank. Within about six months, it runs out.

A growth company that burns cash has three ways to keep going:

  1. Use its own cash, which only lasts so long.
  2. Borrow more. BeanRush already owes $60,000, and lenders get nervous lending to a business that loses money.
  3. Sell new shares. This is the most common route.

Say BeanRush creates 10 new shares and sells them to new investors at $4,000 each. It raises $40,000, enough for another year of expansion. But there are now 110 shares instead of 100. An owner who held one share used to own 1/100 of the business. Now they own 1/110, about 9% less of it.

Dilution = when a company creates new shares, so each existing share owns a smaller slice of the business.

Think of a pizza cut into more slices: the pizza may get bigger, but your slice gets thinner.

Dilution isn't automatically bad. If the $40,000 builds cafés that make the whole business much more valuable, a thinner slice of a much bigger pizza can be worth more than before. But it's a real cost, and it's one reason growth companies are riskier for their owners. When you look at a loss-making company, it's worth checking whether its number of shares keeps going up.

Step 4: What does the whole business really cost?

Here's a puzzle. If you wanted to buy all of BeanRush, would $400,000 (its market cap) be enough?

Think about buying a car that comes with a $5,000 loan still owing on it. The seller asks $20,000. But the loan comes with the car, so you'll have to pay that off too. The car really costs you $25,000. And if the seller left $1,000 in cash in the glovebox, that's yours as well, so the true cost drops to $24,000.

Businesses work exactly the same way. Buy all the shares and you also take on the company's debt, and you get its cash. The true price of the whole business is called its enterprise value, or EV:

Enterprise value = market cap + debt − cash

Our shopBeanRush
Market cap$200,000$400,000
+ Debt (bank loan)+$30,000+$60,000
− Cash−$40,000−$20,000
Enterprise value$190,000$440,000

Our shop has more cash than debt, so the whole business costs a little less than its market cap. BeanRush has more debt than cash, so it costs more. Debt minus cash has its own name: net debt. Our shop's net debt is −$10,000 (it really has $10,000 of net cash); BeanRush's is $40,000.

If this looks familiar, it should. In Part 3 we went the other way: we worked out the value of the whole business with a DCF, then added the cash and took away the loan to get to the value for the shareholders. Enterprise value is the same step run backwards, starting from the share price.

Step 5: Pricing the sales instead of the profit

BeanRush has no profit, but it does have sales. So investors compare the price with the sales instead. There are two versions:

Price-to-sales (P/S) = market cap ÷ revenue

EV/Sales = enterprise value ÷ revenue

Our shopBeanRush
P/E ratio10none (a loss)
Price-to-sales2.04.0
EV/Sales1.94.4

Now the two shops can be compared on the same measure. Counting the debt and cash, buyers are paying about $1.90 for every $1 of our shop's sales, and $4.40 for every $1 of BeanRush's. EV/Sales is usually the fairer of the two, because it counts the debt: a company that's borrowed heavily looks cheaper on price-to-sales than it really is.

But a multiple on its own doesn't tell you whether a price makes sense. For that, we have to ask what BeanRush's buyers are betting on.

Step 6: What would you have to believe?

Let's imagine BeanRush five years from now, under three different futures. In each one, we work out its sales in year 5, give it a margin, and value it the way you'd value a mature business like our shop: at 10 times its profit (the same P/E of 10 as our shop). Then we discount that back to today, as in Part 3. Because BeanRush is a riskier business, we use a discount rate of 15% instead of 10% (riskier means a higher rate, as Part 3 explained).

FutureSales in year 5MarginProfit in year 5Worth in year 5 (10 × profit)Worth today (÷ 2.01)
A: keeps growing 50% a year, margin reaches 15%$759,00015%$114,000$1,139,000$566,000
B: growth slows to 20% a year, margin reaches 15%$249,00015%$37,000$373,000$186,000
C: keeps growing 50% a year, but margin only reaches 5%$759,0005%$38,000$380,000$189,000

Growing 50% a year for five years: $100,000 → $150,000 → $225,000 → $337,500 → $506,250 → $759,375. Discounting five years at 15%: divide by 1.15 five times, which is the same as dividing by about 2.01.

Today's market cap is $400,000. Only future A, where both things go right, is worth more than that. In future B, growth slows and the business is worth less than half the price. In future C, BeanRush grows just as fast, but never learns to keep much of each sale, and the answer is almost exactly the same as B.

That's the key lesson of this article:

A growth stock's price is a bet on two things at once: that sales keep growing fast, AND that the company eventually keeps a healthy share of each sale as profit. If either one fails, the price can fall a long way.

And future A isn't even as good as it looks. To keep growing 50% a year, BeanRush will need more cash, which probably means more new shares. Every round of dilution means each of today's shares gets a smaller part of that $566,000.

A small simplification: here we valued BeanRush's shares directly from its future profit, so the year-5 figure is already the value for the shareholders, with interest on the loan paid out of profit along the way. Real growth-stock valuations, like the one in our Growth Stock Evaluator, forecast every year's cash flow instead of jumping to year 5, but they're answering the same two questions.

Real companies: Rivian vs Toyota

Rivian is a young American maker of electric pick-up trucks, SUVs and delivery vans. It's a real-world BeanRush. Here it is next to Toyota, the steady giant from Parts 2 and 3:

ToyotaRivian
Vehicles sold in a yearabout 9.6 millionabout 42,000
Revenue (last 12 months)$330 billion$5.9 billion
Profit marginabout 9%about −55%
Market cap$229 billion$17.6 billion
Price-to-sales0.73.0
Number of shares, compared with 2022about 4% fewer (it bought some back)about 55% more

Toyota (7203.T) and Rivian (RIVN) figures from Yahoo Finance via KashVector's data service, at the close on 30 October 2026. Toyota converted to US dollars at ¥157.6 per dollar. Toyota's yearly vehicle figure is the one from Part 2; Rivian's 42,247 deliveries in 2025 are from its own year-end production report. In 2025 about $1.6 billion of Rivian's revenue came from software and services, mostly its joint venture with Volkswagen (Rivian's 2025 results).

Rivian loses about 55 cents on every dollar of sales, yet each dollar of its sales is priced at about four times a dollar of Toyota's. That's the BeanRush pattern exactly: investors are paying for the Rivian they hope to see in five or ten years, not the one that exists today.

Rivian's history shows both halves of the bet in action. Its revenue grew from about $1.7 billion in 2022 to $5.4 billion in 2025, but not all of that is cars: about $1.6 billion in 2025 came from software and services, mostly engineering work for Volkswagen under a joint venture. In 2022 Rivian lost money on the cars themselves, before any other costs: building each one cost more than customers paid for it. By 2025 the company as a whole made a small gross profit for the first time, but that came from the Volkswagen work. On the cars alone, it was still losing money. The margin is heading in the right direction, from a very long way back. Meanwhile the number of Rivian shares has grown by more than half since 2022, the dilution from Step 3, as it raised money to keep going. Its deliveries actually fell in 2025, from about 51,600 to 42,200, while it prepared a cheaper new model. Growth stories rarely move in a straight line.

A note on enterprise value and Toyota. Rivian's debt and cash are about equal (around $5.3 billion each), so its enterprise value is almost the same as its market cap. Toyota's is very different: it carries about $279 billion of debt, more than its whole market cap. But most of that debt isn't paying for factories. It funds Toyota's car-finance business, which lends money to customers to buy Toyota cars. For a company like that, the debt is part of the product, a bit like a bank's, so a simple "market cap + debt − cash" overstates what the car business costs. That's why investors compare companies with big lending arms on price-to-sales or P/E rather than EV/Sales. It's a good reminder that every yardstick has places where it doesn't fit.

None of this makes either company a better or worse investment. Rivian's price is a bet on the future, and the numbers show you what that bet is. Whether it pays off depends on exactly the two questions from Step 1: how big its sales get, and how much of each sale it eventually keeps.

Three things to remember

  1. Losing money isn't always a bad sign, but it's always a bet. A growth company can lose money because it's paying for expansion. Its price depends on sales growing fast and margins arriving later.
  2. The whole business costs more than its shares when it has debt. Enterprise value = market cap + debt − cash. EV/Sales compares that with revenue, for companies with no profit to measure.
  3. Watch the share count. A company that keeps selling new shares to fund its losses is cutting each owner's slice thinner.

What's next

BeanRush is a business at the start of its life: spending everything, and more, to grow. In Part 5: Dividends and Franking Credits we go to the other end. When a company like our coffee shop no longer needs all its cash to grow, it can start handing some of it to its owners. That's a dividend, and we use it to value the shop a third way.

In the meantime, our free Growth Stock Evaluator does the steps in this article for any listed company: it checks revenue growth and margins, works out EV/Sales, and shows what growth the share price is assuming.

Try it yourself Compare Rivian and Toyota side by side: growth, margins and valuation for both

New to the series? Start with Part 1: Basics of Stock Investing, then Part 2 and Part 3.

This article is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. It is intended as an educational introduction to how growth companies are valued and does not recommend any particular investment, including the companies used as examples. The coffee-shop and BeanRush figures are invented for illustration. Real-company figures are approximate and were correct at the date of writing; they will change. The future scenarios are mechanical calculations that depend entirely on their assumptions; they are not forecasts. Individual investment decisions depend on your financial situation, risk tolerance, timeline, and objectives. We recommend consulting a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.